
~/consciousness/linguistics
The Initiation That Teaches You to Think in Opposites
Damin and Warlpiri initiation make language an object of thought: a concrete mechanism for transmitting a cognitive breakthrough.
TL;DR
- Warlpiri initiation taught novices to discover a rule for transforming familiar speech.
- Damin reorganizes language around abstract relationships, including whether a group contains the speaker.
- Silence, gesture, speaking rights, and continuing obligations made these operations part of an education.
- A cognitive discovery can spread through a tradition that teaches people how to rediscover it.
A Warlpiri novice listens to two men. One speaks strangely. The other interprets him in ordinary language. The exchange is quick, and nobody explains the trick.
The lesson continues during his seclusion. Men who described the process to the linguist Ken Hale remembered taking two to four weeks to understand it. Then the principle arrived suddenly. They could follow the strange conversations and begin producing the speech themselves. Hale, 1971, pp. 474–475.
Think about what has been transmitted. The novice has heard a finite number of utterances. He leaves with the ability to produce utterances nobody taught him. The teachers have succeeded when he can go beyond their demonstrations.
This is a particularly interesting thing for an initiation ceremony to accomplish. Pain can establish that an occasion matters. A secret can distinguish insiders. An oath can change a person’s obligations. Here the institution also changes what the initiate can deliberately do with his own representations. He becomes able to take familiar speech apart along a dimension he has learned to notice.
I have argued that male initiation helped transmit ways of becoming self-aware. That proposal needs a mechanism. Saying that people undergo a transformation leaves the intellectual work unspecified. What is taught? What changes in the learner? How can one person’s discovery become a repeatable experience for someone else?
Two Australian traditions make those questions unusually concrete. Warlpiri Jiliwirri teaches a transformation of meaning. Lardil Damin reorganizes an entire vocabulary around a small number of abstractions. Their intellectual demands sit inside elaborate arrangements governing who may communicate, by what means, and with whom.
The central achievement is access. A person already speaks, classifies, and takes account of other people. Initiation makes aspects of those activities available for deliberate manipulation. It gives him something new to do with a mind he already possesses.
The opposite of a kangaroo #
The Warlpiri live in central Australia. Their ceremonial speech, usually written Jiliwirri today, substitutes semantic counterparts for ordinary words. In a familiar example, sitting becomes standing, ground becomes sky, and the speaker refers to himself as somebody else. Nicholas Evans renders the transformed sentence as “someone else is standing in the sky.” Evans, 2018.
Before you understand the rule, familiar words have acquired an unfamiliar relationship to the scene. After you understand it, their strangeness becomes informative. A man speaking about the sky may be directing attention precisely toward the ground.
There is a catch. The opposite of tall is easy. What is the opposite of a kangaroo?
Jiliwirri can pair neighboring kinds within a classification. Hale gives kangaroo and euro, two kinds of large macropod. The substitution preserves much of the animal’s identity while changing the feature that separates the two kinds. His account also follows words with multiple senses: the relevant counterpart changes with the meaning intended on that occasion. Hale, 1971, pp. 475–478.
That detail changes the intellectual character of the exercise. If the goal were simply to say something maximally different, a kangaroo could become a thunderstorm, a grandmother, or a hole. Almost any answer would do. A recoverable contrast requires discipline. You hold enough features constant for your listener to identify the dimension you have changed.
This is close to what makes a useful comparison in science. A comparison between wildly different things explains little because too much has changed at once. A controlled comparison preserves a background and varies something against it. The Warlpiri speaker has to do a small version of that work inside an utterance. Which contrast will make the intended meaning recoverable?
The answer depends on a shared understanding of the world. A stranger cannot derive the appropriate animal pairs from the instruction to speak in opposites. He needs to know the classifications his interlocutors use. Abstraction rests on local detail. It becomes powerful because the speakers agree on which details matter.
Polysemy makes the same point from another direction. A word can carry several meanings. A mechanical substitution attached to its sound would sometimes select the wrong counterpart. To preserve the inversion, the speaker must operate on the meaning being used. He has to distinguish the word as an audible item from the semantic job it is performing.
This creates two simultaneous objects of attention. The sentence continues to refer to a scene, but its internal relationships have also become something the speaker can handle. He uses a representation while inspecting how it represents.
The teachers’ arrangement is suited to bringing that distinction into view. Two speakers supply the contrasting performances; a third has to infer their relationship. Once the novice understands, he can generate both sides himself. An operation first displayed between people becomes available within one person’s activity.
Eventually the learner can perform the work initially divided between his teachers.
Learning what counts as silence #
Far to the northeast, on Mornington Island in the Gulf of Carpentaria, Lardil initiation altered the means of communication before introducing its advanced ceremonial vocabulary.
The early stage involved a stringent speech restriction in encounters with people involved in the novice’s initiation, and the use of signing, known as Marlda Kangka. David McKnight discovered how exacting the restriction was while learning a sign involving a fist held at the mouth. He accompanied the sign for blowing on a fire by blowing on his fist. His teachers corrected him: this counted as talking. Snapping fingers and clapping hands were permissible. McKnight, 1999, pp. 157–158, reproduced in Fleming, 2017, p. 12; social scope discussed on pp. 4–5.
Silence had to be learned.
The mistake is revealing because blowing can appear closer to demonstrating an action than to saying a word. Yet the boundary in this setting concerned the use of the mouth. A hand could make a communicative sound while an apparently innocent breath violated the rule.
Anyone learning this distinction has to separate several things that ordinary communication bundles together: an intention to communicate, a bodily action, a sound, and a conventional permission. The same message can survive a change of channel. The same channel can be prohibited even when it is doing something other than ordinary speech.
Even an elementary request for food was reorganized. McKnight describes a novice who could not make the request himself. A senior initiate offered food or water; assent was given by pinching the questioner’s toe. The procedure assigned the initiative to one person and a permitted response to another. McKnight, 1999, pp. 23–24, reproduced in Fleming, 2017, p. 16.
This is a remarkable education in contingency. Hunger remains. Another person remains capable of helping. What changes is the route by which the need can become publicly actionable. The novice has to inhibit a familiar performance and use a substitute within a newly organized relationship.
There is intellectual content here before anyone explains an abstract category. A habitual action becomes visible when you have to stop doing it. A message becomes distinguishable from its normal vehicle when you must deliver it another way. A conversation becomes visibly organized when somebody else controls whether you are allowed to begin.
The later warama stage, associated with subincision, allowed Damin. Its place after the earlier speech restrictions matters. A learner had already lived through the practical separation of communication from ordinary vocal language. The ceremonial vocabulary entered a world in which replacing the usual means of expression was an experienced possibility.
Read as a sequence, the education repeatedly interrupts an identification: this thought must be expressed by this familiar action. The learner discovers alternatives while the social situation continues to require successful communication.
That is more demanding than withdrawing into complete isolation. Other people keep presenting problems. The discipline changes how those problems may be answered.
The speaker becomes a variable #
Damin’s most elegant abstraction concerns the speaker himself.
Ordinary Lardil has nineteen pronoun forms. Damin reduces them to two basic categories: a set containing the speaker and a set excluding the speaker. A large inventory of personal distinctions is reorganized around a single relation. Hale, 1992, pp. 38–39.
The rule is easy to state. Its consequences are worth walking through.
| People being referred to | Damin category |
|---|---|
| The speaker alone | Includes the speaker |
| The speaker and the listener | Includes the speaker |
| The speaker and several absent people | Includes the speaker |
| The listener alone | Excludes the speaker |
| Several absent people | Excludes the speaker |
These are illustrative applications of the same rule. Several distinctions familiar from ordinary speech have been collapsed under a common analysis. Context supplies finer distinctions when they matter.
Now let the listener answer. The center of the classification moves. Someone who belonged to the excluded set a moment ago becomes the person whose presence determines inclusion. The rule is stable while the individual occupying its central position changes.
This is why pronouns are such interesting tools for thinking about minds. A proper name normally follows a person through a conversation. I follows the act of speaking. Each participant can occupy the position, and each participant has to understand other people occupying it.
In The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Pronouns, I argued that person reference belongs near the center of the problem of consciousness. Damin exposes a particularly useful relation: the person making the classification is also one of the possible members of the sets being classified.
Imagine sorting photographs into groups according to whether you appear in them. Then give the task to someone else, who sorts the same photographs according to whether they appear. Nothing in the photographs has changed. The organizing perspective has. Damin’s rule makes this kind of shifting center fundamental to personal reference.
Ordinary Lardil speakers already manage intricate relationships. Their larger pronoun system is evidence of that competence. The intellectual gain in Damin lies in acquiring another analysis of it. A relationship already handled in particular situations becomes available as a general instruction.
The Warlpiri system reaches a similar analysis by a different route. Hale shows that Jiliwirri takes kari, ordinarily a suffix meaning “other,” and uses it as an independent expression for the speaker component shared across five first-person forms. These cover the speaker alone and dual or plural groups, including or excluding the listener. Additional suffixes can specify number and exclusion. Hale, 1971, pp. 479–480.
The ceremonial register has separated a common component and given it a form of its own.
This goes considerably further than exchanging two familiar words. An element that ordinary speech keeps attached to other material is made available independently. A relationship distributed across several pronouns becomes something the speaker can express with the same item.
There is also an extraordinary consequence for self-reference. In this register, the expression whose ordinary contribution is otherness identifies the speaker. Referring to oneself requires a learned displacement into the form of the other.
The two traditions make complementary moves. Damin organizes reference around whether the speaker is included. Jiliwirri isolates the speaker component while expressing it through inversion. Both give a conventional relationship to the self a new, deliberately usable form.
A third central Australian tradition does the same thing. Around 1910 the Lutheran missionary Carl Strehlow wrote down the secret language, ankatja kerintja, that a Western Aranda novice had to learn during his seclusion after circumcision and use with men until it ended. His teacher drilled it into him daily. It gives the novice a new word for himself: ordinary jinga, “I”, becomes anua. “You” becomes rankaltja and “he” becomes altja. Then the duals are built from those parts. Ordinary Aranda has a separate word, ilina, for “we two”; in the secret language it is anuarankaltja, “I-you”. “You two” is rankaltjatnalanga and “they two” is altjatnalanga: the person plus a suffix for two. Where the everyday language keeps the speaker fused inside an unanalysable form, the initiate’s language takes him out and makes him a component that can be combined with others. Strehlow, Die Aranda- und Loritja-Stämme in Zentral-Australien IV.1 (1913), pp. 28 and 32
Their Loritja neighbours did it too. The Loritja novice, healing alone in the bush after circumcision, learns a secret language of his own. Everyday ngaiulu, “I”, becomes ngankulu; nuntu, “you”, becomes ngulu; paluru, “he”, becomes pankuru. He may speak it with men he meets out hunting. When he sees women and children he swings his great bullroarer, the apuju, and they run from what they take to be the voice of the being Maiutu. The new word for “I” and the voice of the god are given to the boy in the same weeks. (Strehlow IV.1, pp. 55–56)
The Loritja “I” is not a code word. Ngankulu is the respectful first person of the Western Desert, the “I” a man uses in his mother-in-law’s hearing, and this careful speech was also used during initiation ceremonies (W. H. Douglas, in R. M. W. Dixon, The Languages of Australia, 1980, p. 61). The boy learns to say “I” the way one speaks before someone who must be honoured. At Warburton Ranges, after a man named Ngayunya died around 1950, the everyday ngayu- fell under the taboo on his name and the whole community said nganku- for “I” for about a decade. A taught “I” can become the ordinary one.
The new “I” carries an n, the consonant that turns up in first-person forms around the world far more often than chance allows (The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Pronouns). The Aranda may have invented the secret words or, as Strehlow suspected, “taken them over from the language of a distant tribe”. The same rite gives the novice his tjurunga, the sacred board that is also his bullroarer, with the words “Dies ist dein Körper, dies ist dein zweites Ich” (“This is your body, this is your second I”). The boy leaves seclusion with a new word for himself and a second self to keep. (Strehlow II (1908), p. 80)
For a theory of reflective self-awareness, this is valuable machinery. The thinker can learn to place himself inside a representation whose organizing rule he also understands. He occupies a perspective and can recognize it as a perspective.
The hand puts the detail back #
Damin extends this style of analysis across its vocabulary. Roughly a hundred stems carry a much larger range of reference. Its temporal vocabulary groups past and future together as outside the present. A productive prefix, kurri-, reverses meanings such as short and long, or light and heavy. Hale and Nash, 1997, pp. 248–249.
Yesterday and tomorrow have opposite relationships to the direction of time. Both nevertheless stand outside now. As with the pronouns, an apparently complicated domain can be reorganized by selecting a center and asking what falls on either side of a distinction.
A reduced vocabulary immediately raises a practical objection. People still need to distinguish a particular fish from other fish. The world has not simplified itself to accommodate the ceremonial language.
The missing information can move into another medium. Evans describes directional expressions made specific by pointing, and a general fish term differentiated by gestures for particular fish, including parrotfish and sole. Films preserve Damin being used with these accompanying movements. Evans, 2017, pp. 38–39.
The voice supplies the category; the hand supplies the discrimination.
That division of labor makes the abstraction workable. A listener receives a general expression and a particularizing action together. Judging the vocabulary in isolation would miss the information carried by the whole exchange. It would be like deciding that a map has failed to identify a location because someone is pointing at it instead of naming the coordinate.
Other references recruit shared stories. Hale and Nash record an expression for sandpiper through its role in a Rainbow Serpent narrative, and a description of a wooden axe through its use in obtaining native honey. Particular things can be recovered through what they do and what people know about them. Hale and Nash, 1997, p. 249.
The intellectual demand is therefore selection. Which part of our shared knowledge will make this creature or tool identifiable here? A speaker works between a compressed expression and a detailed world, relying on the listener to complete the movement.
There is a useful correction here to the idea that abstraction means removing detail until very little remains. Productive abstraction redistributes detail. Some becomes unnecessary for the current purpose. Some remains in the grammar. Some moves into gesture or context. Some must be preserved because an important decision depends on it.
Damin’s kinship categories show the stopping point. Hale explains why the system has five basic terms where a further reduction to four might appear possible: five preserve the distinction between preferred and alternative marriage partners, involving second-cross and first-cross cousins. The remaining distinction matters to action. Hale, 1992, p. 40.
This is abstraction with a purpose. A neat system that erased the distinction would be less useful in the society that used it. The achievement consists partly in knowing where to stop.
The novice is learning a way to carve up experience while remaining answerable to people who know what the carving must preserve. His linguistic education is also an education in relevance.
A familiar mouth can do unfamiliar work #
Damin changes the sounds of speech as well as its meanings. It includes clicks and other unusual ways of producing sound. Hale and Nash analyze systematic relationships between parts of its sound inventory and ordinary Lardil, while distinguishing the observed patterns from their proposed explanations. The ordinary grammatical suffixes remain available as the roots change. Hale and Nash, 1997, pp. 254–256.
An adult learner uses the same mouth to enter a different system of permitted forms. An inherited capacity has possibilities that his ordinary language does not routinely call upon.
That is an especially tangible example of the difference between a human capacity and a culturally established way of exercising it. The vocal apparatus does not specify every language its owner will speak. The existence of an available movement does not mean a person will spontaneously recruit it for the same communicative purpose.
The separation between roots and suffixes is equally instructive. Part of the sentence changes while another part holds it together. The learner can rely on a familiar grammatical structure while doing something unfamiliar with the items placed inside it.
This creates a tractable intellectual problem. If everything changed simultaneously, a learner would have little stable ground from which to identify the transformation. Keeping a framework while changing selected contents makes the change easier to apprehend.
An analogous distinction appears in research on awareness of speech sounds. José Morais and colleagues asked adults to add or remove the initial sound of a nonword. Adults without literacy found these tasks difficult; adults from similar backgrounds who had acquired some reading could perform the manipulation. Fluent speech had not automatically supplied the ability to carry out this particular operation on speech. Morais and colleagues, 1979.
The surprising follow-up came from Chinese readers. Charles Read and colleagues compared people literate in characters alone with people who had also learned an alphabetic transcription. The latter were more successful at adding and deleting consonants. Some retained the manipulation skill even after losing the ability to use the alphabetic system itself. Read and colleagues, 1986.
These studies concern a specific phonological skill, and the groups were not created by randomly assigning lifetimes of education. Their value here is the distinction they make concrete. A person can possess a working system without possessing every deliberate operation that another cultural practice can make available upon it.
The retained skill is particularly suggestive. A teaching device can reorganize an ability in a way that outlasts command of the device. Once the learner has gained access to the relevant units, those units can remain available for manipulation.
Damin supplies an oral route into this broader problem. Its users need no alphabet to participate in a tradition that makes linguistic form conspicuous. The medium of the intellectual tool can vary. What matters is the operation the learner acquires.
This also clarifies what a cognitive initiation could teach. Its most consequential result might be a way of attending that the initiate can use after the ceremony ends. A ritual can disappear from view while a habit of reflection it cultivated continues to organize thought.
Why the teachers need more than a slogan #
Why spend weeks demonstrating a principle that can be summarized in a few words?
Because possessing a sentence about a rule and recognizing how to use the rule are different achievements. A slogan can be repeated while its application remains opaque. The hard part often lies in seeing which features of a new situation should summon the rule.
Mary Gick and Keith Holyoak made this problem experimentally vivid. Their participants encountered stories whose solutions shared a structure: several weak forces converge on a target. They then faced a radiation problem in which a strong beam would damage healthy tissue on its way to a tumor. The solution was to converge weaker beams. The medical setting obscured its relationship to the earlier stories. Gick and Holyoak, 1983.
In one experiment, two relevant stories produced spontaneous transfer in 45 percent of participants, compared with 21 percent after one relevant story and an irrelevant one. A hint raised both figures. In another experiment, adding an explicit principle to two analogies helped substantially; earlier attempts to supplement only one analogy had been much less effective. Experiments 4–5, pp. 21–26.
The experiment supplies a useful comparison for the initiation lesson. What the learner needs is a sense of what can vary while the useful relationship remains the same. Several concrete cases can expose that relationship more successfully than an abstract instruction detached from the right contrasts.
The medical problem also reveals a second difficulty. You may already know a solution without noticing that your present problem is an instance of it. The missing piece is a route from the new occasion to the old operation.
Jiliwirri’s teachers provide paired performances across familiar speech. Every new utterance can become another occasion to recognize the transformation. The novice has to learn what the speech is inviting him to do.
This helps explain why the moment of insight can reorganize the preceding weeks. The earlier exchanges acquire a common structure. What looked like a succession of peculiar statements becomes a set of examples. The learner now understands what they were examples of.
He can also anticipate a new case. A newly encountered animal or a different grouping of people presents fresh material for the relation he has learned to recognize.
The distinction matters for consciousness because a reflective instruction can be equally empty until someone knows how to execute it. Telling a person to examine a thought assumes that the thought has become available as an object of examination. Telling him to see himself as another person assumes that he can construct and occupy the relevant viewpoint.
A teaching tradition can supply the intermediate performances. It can distribute the work between people, repeat it across situations, and give a learner enough comparisons to discover the relation for himself.
The intellectual content of the lesson includes the path by which it becomes intelligible.
A community can build what a person discovers #
There are three timescales in this story.
A community develops a practice. An institution organizes its transmission. A particular learner comes to understand it.
Confusing these processes makes a cultural theory of consciousness unnecessarily brittle. If an initiate describes a flash of understanding, that does not require the whole tradition to have appeared in a flash. If the tradition accumulated over generations, that does not make the individual’s breakthrough an illusion.
Fleming proposes that Damin developed through interactions between signing and vocal activity. On his reconstruction, an existing system of manual communication acquired vocal accompaniments that took on increasingly linguistic work. This challenges the picture of a complete artificial language invented in one stroke. Fleming, 2017, sections 4–7.
The reconstruction places intellectual invention inside a repeated social situation. People already have reasons to communicate under restrictions. They already have a manual system. New combinations of sound and gesture can become conventional, and their users can discover further possibilities.
Once the practice exists, however, a new learner encounters an organized object. Its history need not be repeated inside his head. He may apprehend a relation that took a community a long time to develop.
Algebra offers an ordinary comparison. Mathematical notation accumulated through a history of innovations. A student can nevertheless experience a sharp change when an equation becomes something he knows how to manipulate. The history of algebra and the moment when algebra starts making sense to him are different events.
My Memetic Eve argument depends on a related distinction between possessing a capable brain and possessing a particular way of using it. EToC proposes that reflective self-awareness emerged through a discovery that could be culturally transmitted. Its female-first claim concerns the origin and spread of a particular relation to one’s own mind.
The Australian material helps specify the transmission problem. A cultural practice can arrange for a person to discover a productive relation. The learner experiences a real change while drawing on capacities already present before instruction.
The sharpest version of the proposal concerns a new use for social intelligence. Someone who can interpret other people acquires a way to apply that interpretation to the person doing the interpreting. His own activity becomes available inside a system that already represents activity.
This requires more than giving the self a new name. A name can be repeated without changing what its user can inspect. The consequential change is an operation: the ability to construct the relevant perspective and recognize its object as oneself.
The Warlpiri and Lardil cases give us related operations in forms we can describe. The novice learns to transform an utterance, select a contrast, reorganize reference, or coordinate a general category with a particularizing gesture. These are concrete achievements. Their connection to the earliest discovery of reflective consciousness is my theoretical extension; the ethnography does not date that discovery.
The extension is useful because it replaces an unspecified gift of enlightenment with a teachable kind of intellectual work. The tradition can carry demonstrations and relationships that make the operation discoverable.
A breakthrough can therefore spread by exporting a teaching procedure.
That formulation makes room for considerable cultural variation. Different communities can arrange different performances around a similar intellectual demand. An explicit explanation, a dialogue, a story, a prohibition, and a reversal can each create occasions on which a familiar activity becomes an object of thought. What they share is the relation they enable a learner to grasp.
The revelation belongs to an individual. Its reproducibility is a social achievement.
The school inside the ceremony #
An intellectual practice survives when people have occasions to use it.
Damin was tied to continuing relationships. Hale records restrictions on ordinary Lardil with people involved in initiation until ritual debt had been repaid. He also notes public use and passive knowledge among some people who had not undergone the advanced initiation, including women. Understanding and authorized performance did not coincide perfectly. Hale, 1992, p. 37.
McKnight’s account makes the speaking rights more specific: a sister-in-law bringing food to the initiation ground was expected to use Damin. The ceremonial distribution of knowledge cannot be reduced to a simple division between men who knew and women who did not. McKnight, 1999, p. 26, discussed in Fleming, 2017, p. 7.
These details matter because they explain how an unusual vocabulary can remain useful. The community supplies appropriate interlocutors, legitimate occasions, and consequences for choosing the wrong register. It creates a demand for the ability it teaches.
Marriage relations and ritual obligations give the linguistic distinctions recurring practical force. The initiate has to remember who stands in which relation to him and which form of communication that relation calls for. The education in representation continues inside an education in social position.
This combination also makes the practice vulnerable in a particular way. Its survival depends on access to experienced people and the relationships through which they teach.
Hale describes mission dormitories separating Lardil children from adults and undermining initiation. He also records work by Doug Belcher and Lardil people to restore ceremonies in the 1950s and 1960s, when only about six Damin speakers remained. His account treats renewed development as possible. Hale, 1997, p. 89.
The destruction reached beyond a list of unusual words. It disrupted the arrangement that turned a child into someone able and entitled to use them.
A dictionary can preserve forms and meanings. Recreating an intellectual education requires more: demonstrations, correction, practice, and people who know what successful performance looks like. Where gesture carries information, the words alone preserve only part of the exchange. Where speaking rights follow relationships, a bare sentence does not explain its occasion.
This is why oral traditions deserve to be approached as intellectual institutions. Some of their knowledge resides in propositions. Some resides in a sequence of things one person must do with another before the proposition becomes usable.
The school can be present even when nobody has separated it from the ceremony and given it a different name.
The novice can take hold of his own thought #
The familiar opposition between an individual discovery and a collective tradition dissolves when we look closely at teaching.
The guardians already understand the operation. They arrange performances from which someone else can come to understand it. Their success produces a person capable of going beyond those performances. A shared practice generates an individual capacity.
The Australian examples make several parts of this process visible. Silence exposes the separation between a message and its usual medium. Inversion exposes relationships among meanings. Damin exposes the abstractions available within a rich vocabulary. Its pronouns place the speaker inside a classification that moves as people exchange roles.
Each exercise gives the learner access to something he previously used in a different way. Speech becomes material for transformation. Social reference becomes material for analysis. A familiar action becomes something he can choose, inhibit, or perform through another channel.
For EToC, the decisive further move is the one developed in Déjà You: a system capable of modeling people learns to include its own operation among the things modeled. The interpreter becomes interpretable to himself.
That move acquires a plausible educational form here. Two people can first hold apart the perspectives that a third will eventually coordinate. A rule can become visible through comparisons. A learner can come to recognize a familiar activity as an instance of something more general, then perform the new operation without waiting for another demonstration.
This gives initiation a precise role in a cultural history of the mind. It can preserve the conditions for a discovery, including the social work required to make the discovery happen again.
Return to the Warlpiri novice. The weeks of strange conversations are now intelligible. He knows what his teachers were doing, and he can do it too.
Then he produces a sentence they never gave him.
The tradition has accomplished something more durable than placing another sentence in his memory. It has given him a way to act on the sentences he can already make. An activity that once carried his thought has become something his thought can take hold of.
Sources #
- Hale, Kenneth. “A Note on a Walbiri Tradition of Antonymy.” In Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits, eds., Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics and Psychology. Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 472–482. Archived author copy. Teaching and insight: pp. 474–475; semantic counterparts, polysemy, and generalization: pp. 475–478; extraction of the speaker component: pp. 479–480. The source uses the spellings “Walbiri” and “tjiliwiri.”
- Hale, Ken. “Language Endangerment and the Human Value of Linguistic Diversity.” In “Endangered Languages,” Language 68, no. 1 (1992), pp. 35–41. Original paper. Social use: p. 37; pronouns: pp. 38–39; kinship: p. 40.
- Hale, Ken, and David Nash. “Damin and Lardil Phonotactics.” In Darrell Tryon and Michael Walsh, eds., Boundary Rider: Essays in Honour of Geoffrey O’Grady. Pacific Linguistics C-136, 1997, pp. 247–259. Open-access original. Semantics and grammar: pp. 248–249; sound patterns: pp. 254–256.
- McKnight, David. People, Countries, and the Rainbow Serpent: Systems of Classification among the Lardil of Mornington Island. Oxford University Press, 1999. Bibliographic record. The passages used here—pp. 23–26 and 157–158—were accessed through Fleming’s full paper, which reproduces or discusses them with page references.
- Fleming, Luke. “Artificial Language, Natural History: Speech, Sign, and Sound in the Emergence of Damin.” Language & Communication 56 (2017), pp. 1–18. DOI. Full author-posted text. Historical development from signing is Fleming’s reconstruction; the ethnographic episodes are separately attributed above.
- Evans, Nicholas. “Listening Here: Ngûrrahmalkwonawoniyan.” Humanities Australia 8 (2017), pp. 34–44, especially pp. 38–39. Original issue. Also “Australia’s Indigenous Wordscape,” UNESCO Chair on Language and Education, January 15, 2018. Essay.
- Morais, José, Luz Cary, Jesús Alegria, and Paul Bertelson. “Does Awareness of Speech as a Sequence of Phones Arise Spontaneously?” Cognition 7 (1979), pp. 323–331. Original abstract and bibliographic record.
- Read, Charles, Yun-Fei Zhang, Hong-Yin Nie, and Bao-Qing Ding. “The Ability to Manipulate Speech Sounds Depends on Knowing Alphabetic Writing.” Cognition 24 (1986), pp. 31–44. Original abstract and bibliographic record. The groups also differed in age because educational practices had changed. The essay uses the qualitative task distinction, rather than treating the comparison as a randomized literacy intervention.
- Gick, Mary L., and Keith J. Holyoak. “Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer.” Cognitive Psychology 15 (1983), pp. 1–38. Original paper. Experiments 4–5 and Tables 5–7 supply the reported transfer results.
- Hale, Ken. “Some Observations on the Contributions of Local Languages to Linguistic Science.” Lingua 100 (1997), pp. 71–89. Archived author copy. The account of institutional disruption and ceremonial restoration is on p. 89.